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Recent Cases
TORTs-CoNCLUSVE PRESUMPION THAT ATTRACiVE NusANcE Doc-
TRINE Is OF No BENEFrr AT ACE FouRmEN-Plaintiff, who was ten days
from his fifteenth birthday, was severely burned when he entered an
enclosure containing electrical transformers on defendant's property.
The enclosure was between seventy-five and one hundred feet from
the defendant's office. Plaintiff testified that the gate to the enclosure
had been unlocked for "maybe six months" before the injury. When
questioned whether he believed that the electricity was off because
the gate was ajar, the plaintiff replied, "Yes, I did. What child
wouldn't?", but admitted that he knew the meaning of a danger sign
posted on the enclosure. Psychiatric testimony was introduced to show
that the plaintiff was not of normal mentality for a child of his age.
He had repeated three grades, and was only in the eighth grade at
age sixteen on the date of the trial. The trial court entered judgment
on a directed verdict for the defendant. Held: Affirmed. There is a
conclusive presumption that a child ten days from his fifteenth birthday
is not within the class protected by the attractive nuisance doctrine.
The court reasoned that to hold otherwise would impose a duty upon
landowners to protect older children, as well as adults, if it could be
shown that they are mentally subnormal. Bentley v. South-East Coal
Co., 384 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1960).
The Bentley decision extends to minors of age fourteen the holding
of Columbus Mining Co. v. Napier's Adm'r,' which established a con-
clusive presumption of a child's capacity to appreciate dangers or
assume risks at age fifteen. Despite the Napier rule, the court did not
apply it in subsequent decisions,2 but indicated that an occupier of
land would be liable to children over fifteen years of age if it could
1239 Ky. 642,40 S.W.2d 285 (1931).2 E.g., Dennis' Adm'r v. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79
S.W.2d 377 (1935). A similar disregard of the conclusive presumption at age
fourteen propounded in the Bentley decision is evidenced by dictum in the sub-
sequent sion of Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, 339 S.W.2d 194 (Ky.
1960). In this case the court, without mention of the Bentley case, refused to
apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to a sixteen-year-old boy, and stated at
page 196 as follows:
When a youth has grown beyond the protection humanely afforded a child
of tender years from his indiscretion and lack of capacity to appreciate a peril,
he is not entitled to the benefit of the doctrine any more than is a normal
adult, qualified however in an occasional case of undeveloped mentality. We
so held in relation to a fourteen year old boy in Louisville & N. R. Co. v.
Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W. 175, 53 A.L.R. 1328. That age has since
been regarded as a normal dividing line.
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be shown that the child was of such subnormal mentality as to be
classed with those for whom the protecting rule was created. Although
recovery had seldom been granted to children of age fourteen3 under
the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court had been unwilling to
create a conclusive presumption that the doctrine offered no protection
to minors of that age after the Napier decision. To be accorded the
protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine prior to the Bentley case,
a child between the ages of fourteen and fifteen was required to prove
that he was of subnormal mentality. However, the notable implication
of the Bentley case is that no considerations or circumstances will bring
a child within the protection of the attractive nuisance doctrine after
his fourteenth birthday.
The "age fourteen rule" of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Ken-
tucky is apparently an analogy drawn from the rules of contributory
negligence4 in which a rebuttable presumption of capacity begins at
age fourteen, 5 and the burden is on the child to show his incapacity.
This rule recognizes that under some circumstances a child beyond the
age of fourteen may not in fact have sufficient capacity for contributory
negligence. Age alone is not the test for applying the principle as it
would be under a conclusive presumption in attractive nuisance. The
first question in the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine in
Kentucky involves only the age of the child, and no further considera-
tion need be made of the wrong of either party if he is fourteen. In
contrast to the rebuttable presumption in determining capacity for
contributory negligence, the conclusive presumption at age fourteen
in the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine has no flexibility.
Two recent Kentucky decisions demonstrate the flexible approach
taken by the Court of Appeals in cases involving standards of conduct
for children. In a 1960 case,6 the standard of care required of a fifteen-
year-old who was electrocuted while climbing a bridge was not that
of an adult, but of a person of like age, and capacity under the circum-
stances. A 1959 decision7 held that it was error to instruct on the
contributory negligence of an eight-year-old who had violated a safety
statute in the absence of evidence bearing upon his capacity for con-
3 E.g., Union Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Lunsford, 189 Ky. 785, 225 S.W.
741 (1920) (youth between fourteen and fifteen-entitled to recovery for injury
received by contact with defendants electric wire); see also Kentucky Cent. R.R.
v. Gastineau's Adm'r, 83 Ky. 119, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 3 (1885) (youth between
fourteen and fifteen-entitled to a jury determination of his discretion based upon
age and experience).4 See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Hutton, 220 Ky. 277, 295 S.W. 175 (1927); 25
Ky. L.T. 277 (1937).
548 Ky. L.. 601, 603 (1960).
6 Jones v. Kentucky Util. Co., 334 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960).
7 Baldwin v. Holsey, 328 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1959).
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tributory negligence. The court in its opinion stated that there should
be "no sudden leap at any particular age"8 in measuring a child's
standard of conduct.
In view of these decisions should there be a more flexible applica-
tion of the attractive nuisance doctrine after the fourteenth birthday?
Most recoveries in other jurisdictions have been by children under
fourteen years of age,9 but this is not to say that age should be the only
measurement of the ability to discover dangerous conditions or recog-
nize a given risk. Other jurisdictions have granted recovery or placed
the question before the jury under the attractive nuisance doctrine for
youths of ages fourteen,10 fifteen," sixteen12 and eighteen.' 3 Some com-
mentators have stated that a limitation at any particular age is not
desirable.'
4
The section of the Restatement of Torts'5 dealing with trespassing
children mentions no specific age limitation. However, there is a
clause relating to youthful trespassers which imposes liability upon
a possessor of land for bodily harm to these children caused by
8Id. at 480.
9 Annots., 36 A.L.R. 34, 140 (1925); 89 A.L.R. 486, 489 (1925); 45 A.L.R.
982, 988 (1926); 53 A.L.R. 1344, 1351 (1928); 60 A.L.R. 1444, 1450 (1929);
8 A.L.R.2d 1254, 1299 (1949). E.g., Robinson v. St. Louis S.F.R.R., 172 Ark.
494, 289 S.W. 465 (1926); Ramirez v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 116 Neb. 740, 219
N.W. 1 (1928); Rognow V. Zanesville, 24 Ohio App. 536, 157 N.E. 299 (1926);
Shaw v. Stevenson, 119 Okla. 182, 249 Pac. 306 (1926).
10 Cicero State Bank v. Dolese & Shepard Co., 298 Il. App. 290, 18 N.E.2d
574 (1939) (fourteen-year-old girl drowned in pool); McKiddy v. Des Moines
Elec. Co., 202 Iowa 225, 206 N.W. 815 (1926) (determination of protection for
youth between twelve and fourteen-years-of-age-jury question); Biggs v. Consol.
Barb-Wire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56,Pac. 4 (1899) (fourteen-year-old killed bydangerous machinery on landowner's property).
"Ekdahl v. Minnesota Util. Co., 203 Minn. 374, 281 N.W. 517 (1938),
granted recovery where a fifteen-year-old was electrocuted when raising a mast
on a pole which came in contact with defendant's exposed electric wire. In Tohns
v. Fort Worth Power & Light Co., 30 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), it was
a question for the jury as to the benefit of attractive nuisance doctrine for a
fifteen-year-old who was electrocuted while extricating a kite from the defendant's
electric tower.
12 Skaggs v. Tunis, 27 Ill.App.2d 251, 169 N.E.2d 684 (1960), held that a
sixteen-year-old boy would not be denied benefit of the attractive nuisance
doctrine just because over age fourteen. The same accident involved in the Ekdahl
case, supra note 11, was an issue in Schoor v. Minnesota Util. Co., 203 Minn. 384,
281 N.W. 523 (1938), where a sixteen-year-old was burned by electricitv when
defendant's exposed wire came in contact with a mast handled by the two
children. Recovery was granted under the attractive nuisance doctrine.
1i Harris v. Indiana Gen. Serv. Co., 206 Ind. 351, 189 N.E. 410 (1934)
(eighteen-year-old deaf mute with mentality of a six-year-old burned by electricity
while climbing on electric tower).
14Prosser, Torts § 76(3), at 444 (2d ed. 1955); Green, Landowners Re-
sponsibility to Children, 27 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1948); Tames, Tort Liabilitu of
Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.T. 144, 167 (1953).
15 Restatement, Torts § 839 (1934). Kentucky has adonted this section
without qualification in Fourseam Coal Corp. v. Greer, 282 S.W.2d 129 (Ky.
1955).
[Vol. 50,
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structural or artificial conditions if, in addition to three other requi-
sites,'( "... the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in
coming within the area made dangerous by it..... ." Although the
word "youth" as used in the Restatement provision has not been
specifically interpreted by the Kentucky court, recent cases in Min-
nesota'8 and New Jersey19 reflect the view that there is no sharp
dividing line at which minors cease to be "young children." Neverthe-
less, the Kentucky court has only considered the application of this
section to children under fourteen years of age.20 Therefore, under
the facts of the Bentley case, the same result could have been grounded
upon Kentucky's previous restrictive interpretation of the Restatement
provision.
Therefore, it was not necessary to limit the attractive nuisance
doctrine to children under fourteen by a conclusive presumption of no
benefit at the age. Indeed, the same result could have also been
reached by employing the rebuttable presumption of capacity between
the ages of fourteen and fifteen as had been followed in applying the
attractive nuisance doctrine previously in Kentucky. Support for such
a view is bolstered by the trial judge's peremptory instruction:
I will be frank in saying this boy is a smart boy; every question that
his lawyer asked him was answered logically, reasonably and clearly.
I was much impressed with the boy's mentality as a boy of fourteen.
26 Restatement, Torts § 339 (a), (b) and (d) (1934). These requisites are:
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the
possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass,
and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and
which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of
death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as
compared to the risk to young children involved therein.
17 Id. at clause (c). (Emphasis added.)
( s obnson v. Clement F. Sculley Constr. Co., 255 Minn. 41, 95 N.W.2d 409
(1959).
39 Hoff v. Natural Ref. Prods. Co., 38 N.T. Super. 222, 118 A.2d 714 (1955).
This decision provides a thorough discussion of the age problem found in the cases.
20 Clover Fork Coal Co. v. Daniels, 340 S.W.2d 210 (Ky. 1960) (seven-year-
old-Restatement § 339 applicable for injuries in coal hopper insufficiently safe-
guarded); Hanners v. City of Ashland, 331 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1960) (eight-year-
old-Restatement § 339 not applicable in a public pool drowning); Lynch v.
Kentucky Util. Co., 328 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1959) (eight-year-old-Restatement §
339 not applicable for injury by impalement of band on defendant's guy wire);
Kentucky & Ind. Terminal R.R. v. Mann, 312 S.W.2d 451 (Kv. 1958) (two-year-
old-Restatement § 839 applicable for injuries in a switch yard); Bates v. Caudill,
255 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1953) (ten and eight-year-olds-Restatement § 339 not
applicable to dynamite cap injuries where caps were taken without defendant's
knowledge by a third party).
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He is a bright boy and being such he cannot recover from the com-
pany because his mind is not shown to be a child under fourteen.
21
The capacity of the boy is further indicated by the fact that he knew
the meaning of the danger sign upon the enclosure and when ques-
tioned whether he believed that the electricity was off because the gate
was ajar, he replied, "Yes, I did. What child wouldnt?"22 In summary,
the court selected the least flexible approach to reach its result.
Age can be no more than an indication of ability to appreciate a
given risk. A conclusive presumption does not alter the minor's mis-
judgment or his immaturity. Either the rebuttable presumption of no
benefit at age fourteen or the Restatement view, if applied after age
fourteen, would permit the child to present his case. Mentally sub-
normal children, because of their deficiencies, have a particular need
of at least introducing evidence of their failure to comprehend a risk.
The Bentley rule prevents the jury's inquiry into the negligence of the
land possessor, the nature of the condition on the land or any other
facts upon which reasonable men might differ. In a society increasingly
more industrialized and mechanized such an inquiry would seem
critical in many factual situations. The likelihood that negligent acts
by land possessors today would not be appreciated even by normal
children over age fourteen increases with the complexity of conditions
continually being added to land areas.
Howard Downing
ToRTs-NuisAcE-EAONAiBLE USE-Plaintiff brought an action for
damages for diminution of the market value of her home as the result
of an alleged nuisance created by the defendant, an oil refining com-
pany. Since 1928, defendant had been in operation at this location,
which was zoned for heavy industrial use. Technilogical developments
in the industry dictated the defendant's installation of a "platformer-
unifying" unit in 1957. No evidence was produced that the placement
and use of the unit were not accomplished with ordinary prudence and
discretion; however, the unit necessarily produced a composite noise.
Plaintiffs home, in which she had lived since 1950, was in a residential
district across the street from defendant's plant; it was separated by a
distance of 420 feet from the "platformer-unifying" unit. The trial court
entered judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff. Held: Reversed and a
21 Brief for Appellee, p. 6, Bentley v. South-East Coal Co., 334 S.W.2d 349
(Ky. 1960).
22334 S.W.2d 349 (Ky. 1960). (Emphasis added.) It appears that this
phrase by the child is awkward and unnatural.
[Vol. 50,
